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Citizenship.  Those who have it have the luxury of taking it for
granted—treating passports as tickets across borders, complaining
about the length of lines in airports, envying those who can breeze
through the fast-pass lines with their sparkling new little European
Union (EU) identity cards.  This Article uses the intersection of
citizenship and location as a lens for analyzing the impact of the
post-September 11th use of torture in United States detention facil-
ities including Guantánamo Bay.  The main point of the Article
can be summed up in one sentence: citizenship and location mat-
ter.  There are two concepts here worthy of definition: citizenship
and location.
As explained in this Article, individuals have relationships to
citizenship, and citizenship has its own relationship with individu-
als.  It shapes who people are, what they do, how they perceive and
how they are perceived.  In considering United States’ involvement
in post-September 11th torture and other state-sanctioned abuse of
human rights,1 how citizenship impacts us greatly depends upon
* Julie Mertus received her J.D. from Yale Law School.  She is a professor of Ethics
and Human Rights at American University and has published several books, including
BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2004) and THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005).
† Lisa Davis, a graduate of the masters program in International Affairs at Ameri-
can University, is the 2007–2008 Editor-in-Chief of the New York City Law Review. The
authors would like to thank Jennifer M. Kirby for her invaluable research and edito-
rial assistance.
1 The initiative taken by the U.S. to bolster national security against the threat of
terrorism has sparked an international trend in grave violations of prisoners’ civil and
human rights. See DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS 12–13 (2004) [hereinafter DOD, FI-
NAL REPORT 2004], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/
d20040824finalreport.pdf; DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN & PRITI PATEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
(formerly The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), BEHIND THE WIRE: AN UPDATE
TO ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS (2005), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/
PDF/behind-the-wire-033005.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM:
ABUSES BY U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), http://hrw.org/reports/2004/afghan-
istan0304/afghanistan0304.pdf; AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HUMAN
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our location.
Location matters in two different ways—placement on the
globe and placement in the state.  To put it simply, citizenship is
attached to a particular state.  In other words, states grant citizen-
ship and states take it away; states also physically patrol borders and
decide who enters and exits.2  Activists have long challenged the
authority of the state to exercise control over their lives.  In places
like Kosovo, dissenting populations have gone so far as to create
their own parallel state structures, including their own public wel-
fare system, schools, hospitals and popularly elected government.3
Yet as long as states control borders, state-free citizenship will re-
main a fantasy.  As Americans, when analyzing the impact of U.S.-
condoned human rights abuses in Guantánamo Bay and else-
where,4 we cannot escape our location in the international commu-
nity and our place—as new migrants, descendents of the Pilgrims,
perpetrators and survivors of genocide, survivors of the slave trade,
Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists,
Sikhs, Wiccans, Bahá’ı́s, self-defined—at the center or at the edges
of American life.
This Article makes two arguments about citizenship, location,
and rights, which each have great importance to everyone who
cares about the reports of torture coming out of Guantánamo Bay.
First, outside our state, citizenship matters.  Second, inside our state, citi-
zenship matters.
Outside our state, our citizenship is a label that identifies us
with a state, its leader, its people, its ideology, and its programs,
past and present.  Try as we might to distance ourselves from our
government, we still bear a citizenship status linking us to certain
actions and ideologies with which we might not agree.  The first
section of this Article argues that, due to the United States’ treat-
ment of prisoners in Guantánamo Bay and other detention camps,
we, as Americans, have a default identity as hypocrites and “excep-
2 See, e.g., Margaret E. Montoya, Border Crossings in an Age of Border Patrols: Cru-
zando Fronteras Metaforicas, 26 N.M. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (explaining the importance of
crossing borders). See generally Carrie L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforce-
ment: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113,
120 (2007) (discussing racial profiling in joint state and federal immigration investiga-
tions on the U.S.–Mexico border).
3 See, e.g., Chris Hedges, Albanians Inside Serbia Set to Fight for Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1991, at A1 (describing Albanian creation of parallel hospitals, schools, and
unofficial governments in Kosovo).
4 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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tionalists” at best,5 and, at worst, international criminals.6
Within our state, citizenship matters.  It entails much more
than an admission ticket to a country; it is an entry pass to a way of
life.  Our citizenship clarifies the relationship between the individ-
ual and the state, as well as relationships between and among indi-
viduals and groups.  The guidebook for citizenship comprises the
regulations that both govern the everyday relations between the
ruler and the ruled and construct and regulate the institutions that
mediate between government and society.  In liberal democracies,
the codes of conduct created through citizenship are designed to
ensure equality before the law:  all who achieve the status of “citi-
zen” become rights-holders with equal entitlements to bring claims
against the duty-bearing state.7
The case of the mistreatment of prisoners in Guantánamo
Bay,8 along with other “spillover” discrimination and abuse of eth-
nic and racial minorities in the United States,9 demonstrates that
these equality guarantees are not so equal in practice.  In fact,
there is an inverse relationship between our place in society and
our reliance upon citizenship status to access our rights.  The
closer we are to the center, the less we need to rely upon our citi-
zenship guarantees.  When at the “center” of society, we start tak-
ing for granted our ability to be free from persecution from the
state and to participate in social and political decision-making.  In
contrast, when at the “margins” of society, we must continually be
on guard against state-perpetrated and state-condoned oppression,
and we can never relent in our struggle to be heard by decision-
makers.  Thus, the further we are from the center of society, the
more we need our citizenship guarantee.  In the immediate after-
5 See, e.g., DAVID ROSE, GUANTÁNAMO: THE WAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS (The New
Press, 2004) (providing examples of American exceptionalism).
6 See Nicolas J.S. Davies, The “R” Word: Reparations for Iraq, ONLINE JOURNAL, Feb. 5,
2007, http://www.onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_1714.shtml.
7 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571
(2007) (discussing the relationship between citizenship and culture in democracies);
Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between citizenship and the nation-state).
8 Press Release, ACLU, FBI Inquiry Details Abuses Reported by Agents at Guantá-
namo (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/27816prs20070103.html
(releasing over 200 pages of documents obtained from the FBI, detailing 26 eyewit-
ness accounts by agents of detainee abuse).
9 The Impact on Civil Rights in the United States of the September 11 Attacks (Human
Rights First, Working Paper prepared for the International Conference on Terrorism
and Human Rights, 2002), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/after_911/af-
ter_911_09.htm (providing examples of impact of response to 9/11 on civil rights in
the U.S.).
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math of September 11th, everyone from the margins to the center
lived in a climate of fear and mistrust, but those at the margins
were most susceptible to government-sanctioned abuses.10  Today,
despite a somewhat less fearful environment, the disparities in ex-
periences between those at the margin and center continue.
I. THE TAINTED AMERICAN IMAGE ABROAD
At one point in time—in the late Tito era in then Yugoslavia—
an American traveling in the Balkans was likely to hear someone
from Yugoslavia cheerfully declare: “We have the best passport in
the world!”11  More importantly, no one would snicker.  After all,
there was something to be said for Yugoslav citizenship at that time.
Neither aligned East nor West, North nor South, the Yugoslav peo-
ple had friendly relations with most states and could travel just
about everywhere.12  Not only were they welcomed by almost all
people and governments, but numerous political movements and
government coalitions in all corners of the globe also sought their
association.13  In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, however, the
Yugoslav passport has become one of the least popular emblems of
citizenship; it certainly no longer guarantees ready access and re-
spect in all corners of the world.
The United States appears to be headed in the same direction.
The love of American citizenship has become tainted as well, re-
sulting in the similar displacement of positive myths about what it
means to be American.  In a few terrible moments, with the broad-
casting of the brutal images of prisoner mistreatment in Abu
Ghraib14 and reports of similar abuse at Guantánamo Bay,15 the
10 See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/
11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 170–74
(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., Public Affairs 2003) (providing overview of
racial profiling since 9/11); Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants:
Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 867–68 (2003) (providing an
overview of the impact of 9/11 on discrimination and other mistreatment of Mexican
immigrants).
11 This observation is drawn from author Julie Mertus’ firsthand observations from
living in the Balkans in the early- and mid-1990s.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 E.g., CNN GALLERY: ABUSE AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON (2005), http://www.cnn.com/
2004/WORLD/meast/05/13/iraq.abuse/index.html; ABC NEWS IRAQI PRISONER
ABUSE PHOTOS: HORRORS AT ABU GHRAIB, http://abcnews.go.com/International/
News/popup?id=133596 (last visited Oct. 14, 2007); WASHINGTONPOST.COM, at http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/mideast/gulf/iraq/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
15 Former Guantánamo detainee statements have set out details of their mistreat-
ment. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMPOSITE STATEMENT: DETENTION IN
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image of America-as-human-rights-savior was replaced with
America-as-torturer.16  The post-September 11th climate has wit-
nessed a deepening of the contemptuous attitude of the United
States to international law,17 and especially to international organi-
zations charged with the implementation of human rights.18  By
acting as if United States compliance with international law is op-
tional and subject to reinterpretation, and by adopting a confident
you’re-with-us-or-against-us attitude,19 the Bush administration has
projected abroad the image of the selfish playground bully.  The
following section explains how the United States’ position on its
obligations under international law—specifically those related to
torture and to the Geneva Conventions generally—and the down-
grading of U.S. involvement in international agreements contrib-
ute to the image of American citizenship.
A. The Tortured Law of Torture
The Bush administration’s guiding principle regarding the sta-
AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2004), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/
reports/docs/Gitmo-compositestatementFINAL23july04.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2005: UNITED STATES COUNTRY SUMMARY REPORT, 499–509 (2005),
available at http://hrw.org/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf.
16 See DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT 2004, supra note 1, at 18–19 (“The damage
these incidents [of abuse] have done to U.S. policy, to the image of the U.S. among
populations whose support we need in the Global War on Terror and to the morale of
our armed forces, must not be repeated.”).
17 Robert K. Goldman, Trivializing Torture: The Office of Legal Counsel’s 2002 Opinion
Letter and International Law Against Torture, 12 NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BR. 1 (2004), available
at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/lgoldman.cfm.  Goldman describes this
contemptuous attitude:
Apart from ignoring Supreme Court decisions rejecting such exorbitant
claims of executive powers, the Office of Legal Counsel’s arguments re-
flect either an appalling ignorance of, or sheer contempt for, interna-
tional law. . . .  It would be difficult to construct legal arguments that
could be more exquisitely antithetical to and utterly destructive of the
underlying object and purpose of the Torture Convention than those
contained in the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion.
Id. at 3–4.
18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S.: PENTAGON DENIES ACCESS TO GUANTÁNAMO TRIALS:
HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS SHUT OUT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS (Feb. 24, 2004), http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/24/usdom7585.htm (“The Pentagon has refused to
allow three leading human rights groups to attend and observe military commission
trials of detainees at Guantánamo Bay.”).
19 Bush Says It Is Time for Action, CNN, Nov. 6, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/
2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/; see also Michael Kramer, Waging War on Two
Fronts, DAILY NEWS (NEW YORK), Sept. 16, 2001, at 16; Youssef M. Ibrahim, The Mideast
Threat That’s Hard to Define, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at B1; Leaders: A World and Its
Losses: One Year on, Lessons Remain Unlearned, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Sept. 11, 2002,
at 19.
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tus of the detainees in Guantánamo Bay and detainee rights under
international law was best summarized in a Washington Post edito-
rial that said that the “Bush administration would respect interna-
tional law only so far as it chose to.”20  Indeed, President Bush flatly
declared that he could ignore international treaties, stating, “I have
the authority to suspend Geneva [Conventions] as between the
United States and Afghanistan . . . [and] I reserve the right to exer-
cise this authority in this or future conflicts.”21
The issue of torture was taken up by the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment in the summer of 2002, after the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) sought guidance as to how it should treat prisoners held at
Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere.22  The Justice Department’s Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, under the direction of Jay Bybee, produced a
fifty-page memo that gave the green light to torture.23  The “Bybee
memo” reached three conclusions: first, that President Bush could
authorize torture even though our laws and treaties prohibit it; sec-
ond, the interrogators could cause a lot of pain without crossing
the line to torture; third, that even if those interrogators were later
prosecuted for engaging in torture, there were legal defenses they
could use to avoid accountability.24
The Bybee memo attempted to create a truly remarkable “self-
defense” exception for torture.25  It reasoned that an interrogator’s
actions would be “justified by the executive branch’s constitutional
authority to protect the nation from attack.”26  This was contrary to
well-established international law.  There simply is no self-defense
exception to torture, either by an individual or by the state.  The
U.N. Convention Against Torture, Article 2 provides that “[n]o ex-
ceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
20 Editorial, The Guantánamo Story, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at A24.
21 Matt Kelley, Justice Dept. Repudiates Torture Memo: Bush Reserved Specific Right to
Ignore Geneva Conventions, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 24, 2004, at A1.
22 See Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV.
235, 240 (2007).
23 See Memorandum from the Justice Dep’t Office of Legal Counsel on Standards
of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Alberto R. Gonzalez,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo], available at http:/
/www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020801_JD_
%20Gonz_.pdf.
24 See id. at 1–3.
25 Id. at 39 (“[S]elf-defense could justify interrogation methods needed to elicit
information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its
citizens.”); see also id. at 42–46.
26 Id. at 46.
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gency, may be invoked as a justification for torture.”27
To reach its conclusions, the Bybee memo had to redefine tor-
ture in a manner that departed radically from both U.S. and inter-
national understandings of the prohibition against torture.  The
memo came up with what Bybee called an “aggressive interpreta-
tion as to what amounts to torture,”28 asserting that for an act to
constitute torture, it must be of an “extreme nature” in that it
“must inflict pain that is difficult to endure.”29  The memo ex-
plained that “[p]hysical pain amounting to torture must be
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or
even death.”30  The memo severely limited the possibility that
mental pain or suffering can amount to torture, stating that “it
must result in significant psychological harm of significant dura-
tion, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”31
Applying the Bybee torture definition, interrogation tech-
niques that clearly went beyond earlier practice32 were approved by
the Secretary of Defense on December 2, 2002.  These techniques
include: using stress positions such as standing continuously for
four hours at a time; detention in isolation for up to thirty days;
placing a hood over a detainee’s head during questioning; depriv-
ing a detainee of light and auditory stimuli; removing clothing; in-
terrogations lasting for up to twenty hours; and using individual
phobias, such as a detainee’s fear of dogs, to induce stress.33
After intense international and national pressure, the above
list of tactics was reconsidered and rescinded.34  Instead, the Secre-
27 U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (en-
tered into force June 26, 1987), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/
cat.pdf [hereinafter CAT].  For this and other international law provisions on torture,
see AMNESTY INT’L, WHAT DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW SAY ABOUT TORTURE?, http://
web.amnesty.org/48256B3A0045BBF3/torture_internationallaw_page_eng (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2007).
28 Bybee Memo, supra note 23, at 31.
29 Id. at 1.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See supra note 1; see also Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Torturing the Law: The
Justice Department’s Legal Contortions on Interrogation, WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at B3.
33 Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, Dir., J2, Dep’t of Def., to Commander of Joint
Task Force 170, Request of Approval of Counter-resistance Techniques (Oct. 11,
2002), attached to memorandum from William J. Haynes II to Sec’y of Def., Counter-
resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nation/documents/dodmemos.pdf.
34 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Situation
of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006),
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tary of Defense authorized the following techniques for treatment:
incentives and removal of incentives, like comfort items; “change
of scenery,” which might include exposure to extreme tempera-
tures and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli; environmental
manipulation, or altering the environment to create moderate dis-
comfort by adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant
smell, for example: sleep adjustment, or adjusting the sleeping
times of the detainee by reversing sleep cycles from night to day;
and isolating the detainee from other detainees while still comply-
ing with basic standards of treatment.35
The legal validity of this list was immediately questioned.36
These techniques met four of the five elements in the Conven-
tions’ definition of torture—the acts in question were perpetrated
by government officials; the acts had a clear purpose, such as intel-
ligence gathering or extracting information; the acts were commit-
ted intentionally; and the victims were in a position of
powerlessness.37  Although it is difficult to assess in the abstract
whether treatment was aimed at humiliating victims, it can be as-
serted that stripping detainees naked—particularly in the presence
of women and taking into account cultural sensitivities—can cause
extreme psychological pressure and can amount to degrading
treatment or even torture.38  Some of the techniques—in particu-
lar the use of dogs, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep depri-
vation for consecutive days, and prolonged isolation—can cause
severe suffering.39
B. “Creative” Interpretation of International Law
Throughout its entire second term in office, the Bush adminis-
tration has been vigorously pursuing legal validity for interrogation
practices that violated the Geneva Conventions.  In late October
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.
120_.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Guantánamo Report].
35 Id. (citing Memorandum from U.S. Sec’y of Def. on Counter-Resistance Tech-
niques in the War on Terrorism to Commander, U.S. Southern Command (Apr. 16,
2003), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
03.04.16.pdf).  See also Executive Summary from Albert T. Church to Sec’y of Def.,
4–6, 12–14 (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/
d20050310exe.pdf (disclosing the results of the U.S. Department of Defense review of
detention operations and interrogation techniques at Guantánamo Bay).
36 U.N. Guantánamo Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 49–52.
37 Id. at ¶ 51; see also CAT, supra note 27, art. I, ¶ 1.
38 U.N. Guantánamo Report, supra note 34, ¶¶  51–52.
39 Id. at ¶ 52; DEP’T OF DEF., ARMY REGULATION 15–6: FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION
INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION
FACILITY 2 (amended June 9, 2005).
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2005, Vice President Cheney and CIA Director Porter Goss urged
Congress to exempt the CIA from the McCain amendment,40
which banned torture of any detainee in U.S. custody.41  In the
wake of publicized prisoner-abuse committed by the U.S. military
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the energetic lobbying effort led by Che-
ney and Goss heightened concerns among lawmakers and human
rights groups about the treatment of detainees in the secretive CIA
system.42  The Bush administration did little to alleviate suspicions
when President Bush attached a “signing statement” to the McCain
amendment, declaring that the President had the right at any
point not to comply with the ban on cruel, inhumane, and degrad-
ing punishment.43  The executive branch, he declared, would in-
terpret the Amendment “in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with
the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.”44
Vice President Cheney’s office also voiced strong opposition to
regulations of a new U.S. Army Field Manual, released September
6, 2006, that barred torture and upheld the Geneva Conventions.45
Their stiff opposition delayed the manual’s publication for a year.46
At a morning briefing for the manual’s release, Pentagon officials
40 Liz Sidoti, McCain: Detainee Torture Ban Must Stay: The White House Wants to Loosen
a Provision Approved by the Senate, but May Disagree, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 26,
2005, at A11.  Cheney and Gross suggested excluding “overseas clandestine
counterterrorism operations by agencies other than the Pentagon” from the provi-
sion.  Reasonably, McCain concluded that such an exemption “would basically allow
the CIA to engage in torture.” Id.
41 R. Jeffrey Smith & Josh White, Cheney Plan Exempts CIA from Bill Barring Abuse of
Detainees, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2005, at A1.
42 See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing Within
Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set-Up After 9/11, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 2005, at A1.
43 See Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban: Waiver Right Is Reserved,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/arti-
cles/2006/01/04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_ban/. See also John W. Dean, The
Problem with Presidential Signing Statements: Their Use and Misuse by the Bush Administra-
tion, FINDLAW, Jan. 13, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20060113.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2007).
44 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza
Act, 2006, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30 2005).
45 Jim Lobe, Bush Yields to Geneva Conventions on Detainees, ANTIWAR.COM, Sept. 7,
2006, at 2, http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=9663; DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 2-
22.3 (FM 34–52) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COL-
LECTOR OPERATIONS (2006), available at http://www.tortureontrial.org/art/
Exhibit3filed.pdf.
46 Lobe, supra note 45.
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denounced the use of torture, pointing out its ineffectiveness in
obtaining reliable intelligence.47  The bans against cruel and de-
grading treatment in the manual did not apply, however, to CIA
officials.  Indeed, any hopes that the briefing portended significant
changes to the treatment of detainees in the so-called war on terror
were summarily dashed by President Bush’s speech that afternoon.
In his address, he confirmed the existence of a secret CIA deten-
tion program, defended CIA officials’ use of “alternative” interro-
gation methods, and called on Congress to pass proposed
legislation on military commissions to try detainees at Guantánamo
Bay.48  Included among its many problematic provisions, the legis-
lation would permit trials in which secret evidence and statements
secured under coercion could be used.49
Anyone who believed that the federal checks-and-balances sys-
tem might halt President Bush’s extreme use of executive power
and his placement of the United States plainly among the list of
nations that abuse human rights would be sorely disappointed by
the actions of the U.S. Congress.  While some representatives and
senators publicly denounced the administration’s efforts to legalize
its violations of detainees’ rights,50 Congress ultimately acquiesced
to President Bush’s presumed prerogatives.51  In response to the
Supreme Court’s June 2006 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,52 which
upheld the Geneva Conventions and detainees’ right to use habeas
corpus,53 Congress, at the urging of the President, passed the Mili-
tary Commissions Act (MCA).54  The MCA largely undid the pro-
tections established in Hamdan; detainees could not access their
47 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S.: BUSH JUSTIFIES CIA DETAINEE ABUSE: PROPOSED
MILITARY COMMISSIONS DEEPLY FLAWED (Sept. 6, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/09/06/usdom14139.htm [hereinafter HRW, DETAINEE ABUSE] (“No good intel-
ligence comes from abusive interrogation practices.” (quoting Lieutenant General
John F. Kimmons, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Intelligence)).
48 President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commis-
sions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html.
49 HRW, DETAINEE ABUSE, supra note 47.
50 See Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Do the Right Thing, WASH. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2006, at A16; see
also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Reach of War: The Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at
A1.
51 See Christopher M. Evans, Note, Terrorism on Trial: The President’s Constitutional
Authority to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission, 51 DUKE L.J.
1831 (2002) (examining post-9/11 Bush administrative measures with regard to try-
ing those suspected of terrorism).
52 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
53 Id. at 2756–57.
54 MILITARY COMM’NS ACT OF 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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rights under the Geneva Conventions, and they would face trials
with much lower standards of justice than U.S. courts provide.55
Military commissions with highly questionable impartiality will try
detainees,56 secret evidence and coerced statements can be used,57
and U.S. officials are granted immunity from prosecution for past
abuses of detainees.58
Every international human rights body has rejected the Bush
administration’s attempt to classify detainees as “unlawful combat-
ants.”59  In May 2006, the U.N. Committee against Torture60 chas-
tised the United States for violating the human rights of those held
captive in the war on terror.61  The CAT committee rejected U.S.
55 U.S. courts have limited jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions.  See 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 950j; 10 U.S.C.A. § 949a-o (military commission trial procedures generally); 10
U.S.C.A. § 948b(b) (inapplicability of other provisions—speedy trial, compulsory self-
incrimination and pretrial investigation—to military commission); 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 948b(g) (noting that Geneva Conventions are not a source of rights for those sub-
ject to trial by military commission).
56 AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006:
TURNING BAD POLICY INTO BAD LAW 8 (Sept. 29, 2006), http://web.amnesty.org/li-
brary/pdf/AMR511542006ENGLISH/$File/AMR5115406.pdf.  Among other find-
ings, the report states that the Act will:
[e]stablish military commissions whose impartiality, independence and
competence would be in doubt, due to the overarching role that the
executive, primarily the Secretary of Defense, would play in their proce-
dures and in the appointments of military judges and military officers to
sit on the commissions.
Id.
57 Id. (reporting on the use of classified evidence against a defendant, without the
defendant necessarily having the means or permissibility to challenge the govern-
ment’s “sources, methods or activities” in gathering the evidence).
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000DD-1 (codifying the “qualified immunity” defense already availa-
ble to federal officials; see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We there-
fore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”)). See generally THE CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE, FAQS ABOUT
THE MILITARY COMM’NS ACT, http://www.cvt.org/main.php/Advocacy/TortureisUn-
American/FAQs:MilitaryCommissionsAct (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
59 See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful Combatants” or “Prisoners of
War”: The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 59 (2003) (explaining politi-
cal use of term “unlawful combatants” and its alternatives).
60 The Committee is an international body of experts that monitors state conform-
ity with CAT.  For relevant information on the Committee, the Convention, and State
Parties reporting, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Committee Against Torture, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007). See also supra note 27.
61 See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention: United States of America, U.N. Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2
(July 25, 2006) [hereinafter CAT U.S. Report], available at http://daccessdds.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/432/25/PDF/G0643225.pdf?OpenElement.
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claims that the Convention against Torture did not apply to U.S.
personnel acting outside of the United States or during wartime.62
CAT called on the United States to close all secret detention cen-
ters; hold accountable senior military and civilian officials who au-
thorized, acquiesced or consented to acts of torture committed by
their subordinates; and end its practice of transferring detainees to
countries with no “diplomatic assurance” that detainees will not be
subject to torture.63  It also specifically criticized the indefinite de-
tention of prisoners in Guantánamo Bay and called for its
closure.64
In its attempt to avoid culpability for its interrogation prac-
tices, the Bush administration uses another tactic known as “ex-
traordinary renditions”65—also referred to as “outsourcing
torture.”66  Substantial evidence exists that the United States has
been covertly transferring terrorism suspects to other countries—
notably Jordan, Egypt, and Syria—which are known for employing
coercive interrogation methods.67  The United States’ involvement
in these transfers serves as a poor example to other states and com-
prises an additional violation of international law and human
rights protections.
In September 2006, the Bush administration finally admitted
to the existence of secret CIA prisons across the globe, the indica-
tions of which had been reported months prior in mainstream
news.68  While the Bush administration denied using torture, CIA
62 Id. at ¶¶ 14 & 15.
63 Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19, 21.
64 Id. at ¶ 22.
65 See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendi-
tion Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309, 314–24 (2006) (outlining
the practice of extraordinary rendition).  See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, Extraordinary Rendi-
tion, CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/18/
opinion/courtwatch/main674973.shtml.
66 Charles Knight, Outsourcing Torture and the Problems of ‘Quality Control,’ FOREIGN
POLICY IN FOCUS, May 18, 2004, http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/0405torture.pdf. See
also Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106; Sadat, supra
note 65, at 315.
67 See David E. Kaplan, Playing Offense: The Inside Story of How U.S. Terrorist Hunters
Are Going After Al Qaeda, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 25, 2003, available at http:/
/www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030602/2terror.htm; Dana Priest & Barton
Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on
Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1;
Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at A1.
68 E.g., Bush: CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, CNN.COM, Sept. 7, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/06/bush.speech/index.html. See also in-
fra notes 69 & 71.
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interrogators are permitted to use agency-approved “Enhanced In-
terrogation Techniques.”69  These techniques include actions in vi-
olation of both United States’ Military Law and the United
Nations’ Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which the United
States is a signatory.70  Detainees and human rights organizations
report that interrogators in the secret prisons have used meth-
ods—including “water boarding”71—that are deemed torture by
the treaty.72
Though it claims that the CIA does not use torture, the Bush
administration still moved in November 2006 to bar detainees from
talking to anyone, even their lawyers, about the “alternative interro-
gation methods” they underwent at the secret CIA prisons.73  The
administration argued that under the new Military Commissions
Act, these detainees have no right to speak to a lawyer because the
Act negates their access to the U.S. criminal court system.74
“Excessive secrecy has been a consistent theme of the Bush
administration.”75  In this environment, Americans have no way of
knowing if the administration is actually adhering to the law, or if
its interrogators are actually limiting their methods to actions
69 See, e.g., Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques De-
scribed: Sources Say Agency’s Tactics Lead to Questionable Confessions, Sometimes to Death,
ABCNEWS.COM, Nov. 18, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/
story?id=1322866&page=1.
70 CAT, supra note 27.
71 Ross & Esposito describe the process of “waterboarding”:
The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head
slightly below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face
and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a
terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the
treatment to a halt.
Ross & Esposito, supra note 69. E.g., Carol D. Leonnig & Eric Rich, U.S. Seeks Silence on
CIA Prisons: Court Is Asked to Bar Detainees from Talking About Interrogations, WASH. POST.,
Nov. 4, 2006, at A1 (“Captives who have spent time in the secret prisons . . . have said
the detainees were sometimes treated harshly with techniques that included
‘waterboarding,’ which simulates drowning.”); Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, C.I.A.
Expands Its Inquiry into Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A10.
72 See Ross & Esposito, supra note 69 (referencing a 2004 classified report prepared
by CIA Inspector General John Helgerwon identifying interrogation techniques as
cruel and degrading treatment pursuant to the Geneva Convention).
73 E.g., Leonnig & Rich, supra note 71.
74 See id.
75 Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Commentary, Secrecy, the Enemy of De-
mocracy, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2006, at 7. See also Drowning in a Sea of Faux Secrets: Policies
on Handling of Classified and Sensitive Information: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Na-
tional Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the H. Comm. on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2006/
faux.pdf.
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outside of the administration’s narrow definition of torture.76  As
A. John Radsan, former assistant general counsel at the CIA, stated,
“I am not against all secrets.  Keeping some of them is necessary to
our diplomacy, our military policy, and our intelligence activities.
But a secret government, segregated from reasonable checks and
balances, is contrary to the principles many Americans have nobly
sacrificed to protect.”77  In an atmosphere where revelations of ex-
ecutive secrecy are not met with shame, but with assertions that the
so-called war on terror justifies all, there could be no end to the
potential wrongful or illegal actions by this administration.
II. TAINTED CITIZENSHIP GUARANTEES AT HOME
The U.S. State Department webpage on asylum depicts the
United States as a safe haven:
Every year, thousands of people come to the United States in
need of protection because they have been persecuted or fear
they will be persecuted on account of their race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Those found eligible for asylum are permitted to re-
main in the United States.78
The reality, however, is that America has become less secure for all
of its residents.79  This is especially true for those living at the mar-
gins of society, including religious and ethnic minorities.80  Accom-
panying this shift has been an increasingly chilly attitude toward
76 A. John Radsan, The Secret Government, JURIST, Mar. 10, 2006, http://ju-
rist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/secret-government.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
77 Id.
78 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, What Is Asylum?, http://
www.uscis.gov/ (follow “Services & Benefits” hyperlink; then follow “Humanitarian
Benefits” hyperlink; then follow “Asylum” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
79 See generally Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 767 (2002) (exploring the nature of civil liberties before and after 9/11, focusing
on historical events and strategies applied by the government, which affect the secur-
ity of Americans today).
80 Id. at Part IVA. See also MICHAEL RATNER, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
MAKING US LESS FREE: WAR ON TERRORISM OR WAR ON LIBERTY?, http://www.ccrny.
org/v2/viewpoints/viewpoint.asp?ObjID=YLhsqUx1eu&Content=143 (last visited
Oct. 16, 2007) [hereinafter RATNER, MAKING US LESS FREE] (“The government’s cam-
paign  against non-citizens, particularly Muslims, has at times flowered into explicit
religious bigotry.”).  For discussion on how racial profiling illustrates the increased
governmental intrusion into minority communities, see Kevin R. Johnson, September 11
and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 868–69
(2003); Sherry F. Colb, The New Face of Racial Profiling: How Terrorism Affects the Debate,
FINDLAW, Oct. 10, 2001, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20011010.html; Kim Zet-
ter, Why Racial Profiling Doesn’t Work, SALON.COM, Aug. 22, 2005, http://
archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/22/racial_profiling/index.html.
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foreigners since September 11th.81  Although asylum seekers and
economic migrants still flock to the United States, they have good
reason to be skeptical that American citizenship will provide the
kind of legal safeguards that they need.82
A. Targeting Ethnic Minorities
The general tightening of U.S. borders and the fear of ter-
rorists crossing over them has led to many new border protocols.83
Some of the changes are particularly felt by non-U.S. citizens.  For
example, for non-citizens who travel to the United States, finger-
prints and photographs are now standard procedure.84  “[P]eople
whose demographics and immigration statuses resembled those of
the nineteen hijackers” have been subjected to particularly intru-
sive and discriminatory treatment.85  According to “Operation Lib-
erty Shield,” a U.S. Department of Homeland Security policy
announced in 2003, asylum seekers from a list of Asian, North Afri-
can, and Middle Eastern nations may be detained for the duration
of their asylum proceedings without the possibility of an individual-
ized review before an impartial adjudicator.86  Immigrants sus-
pected of entering without proper documentation may be held in
detention—without notifying their families and for unspecified
amounts of time—while their cases are pending.87
In the aftermath of September 11th, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
81 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (now known as HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST), A
YEAR OF LOSS: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/loss_report.pdf [hereinafter A YEAR OF
LOSS].  This report discusses new procedures implemented by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in response to the September 11th attacks, aimed at
“gaining greater control over the admission of immigrants and visitors into the coun-
try, and tracking and monitoring those in the United States.” Id. at iii–iv.
82 See, e.g., Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding
the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 63 (2002).
83 See generally Protecting the Homeland Post September 11: Strengthening Border Security,
APOSTILLE U.S., Sept. 8, 2006, http://apostille.us/news/protecting_the_homeland_
post_september_11_strengthening_border_security.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
84 For more on the procedures used in racial profiling see Stephen H. Legomsky,
The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Non-Citizens: National Security and International
Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 170–71 (2005).
85 Id. at 171 (discussing the so-called “voluntary interviews” coordinated by Depart-
ment of Justice’s Executive Office for the United States Attorneys).
86 Letter from Rory Mungoven, Global Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch,
to OHCHR Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Feb. 13,
2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/25/global8227.htm.
87 See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Refugees in Limbo: Ordered Out of U.S., but with Nowhere to
Go, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at A1.
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vice (INS), agencies of the Department of Justice, began question-
ing thousands of people with possible information about or
connections to “terrorist activity.”88  The agencies’ choice of whom
to interrogate “often appeared to be haphazard, at times prompted
by law enforcement agents’ random encounters with foreign male
Muslims or neighbors’ suspicions.”89  This questioning resulted in
arrest and incarceration for approximately 1,200 non-citizens.90
The majority of these detainees were from Arab and Muslim coun-
tries.91  Of the 762 individuals arrested by the INS, nearly all were
charged with immigration violations completely unrelated to
terrorism.92
As Human Rights Watch testified before the United Nations:
Three hundred and seventeen were held without charge for
more than forty-eight hours; thirty-six were held for twenty-eight
days or more without charge; thirteen were held for more than
forty days without charge; and nine were held for more than
fifty days without charge. One Saudi Arabian detainee was held
88 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES 3 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2002/us911/USA0802.pdf [hereinafter HRW, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT] (providing a
comprehensive analysis of the mistreatment of non-citizens in the wake of 9/11
through interviews with current and former detainees and their attorneys). See
RATNER, MAKING US LESS FREE, supra note 80, at 5; Anita Ramasastry, A Flawed Report
Card: How DOJ Mishandled the Post-September 11 Detention Process, FINDLAW, Aug. 1, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20030801.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
89 HRW, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, supra note 88, at 3, 9 (questioning of detainees’
link to terrorist activity was based on “indications” which in many cases was little more
than nationality, religion or gender).
90 Id. at 9; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRA-
TION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS
(2003) [hereinafter DOJ, DETAINEES REPORT] (a comprehensive report on post-9/11
treatment of detainees including arrest and charging, clearing, holding, removal, and
confinement).
91 HRW, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, supra note 88, at 9 (“The largest group of detain-
ees (248) was from Pakistan, followed by Egypt, 100, and Turkey, fifty-two.”). See also
Jennifer Daskal, Advocacy Dir., U.S. Program, Human Rights Watch, Statement of
Human Rights Watch to the United Nations Human Rights Committee: U.S. Compli-
ance with the ICCPR (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/03/14/usdom12942_txt.htm [hereinafter Daskal Statement].
92 DOJ, DETAINEES REPORT, supra note 90, at 5. See also HRW, PRESUMPTION OF
GUILT, supra note 88, at 9.  For a discussion on the legality of the arrests, see Ronald J.
Riccio, Subjecting War to the Law: Court Rules on Power to Detain Prisoners of the War on
Terror and on the Limits of the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ 177 N.J.L.J. 321 (2004). For further inquiry
into immigration violations, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2003) (determining proceedings
for the disposition of cases of immigrants arrested without warrants); see also Custody
Procedures, 66 FED. REG. 48334 et seq., Sept. 20, 2001 (discussing the purpose for
codifying the proceeding section of C.F.R.).
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for 119 days without charge.93
Some of these detainees were also subject to extremely abusive
conditions, especially when held at the Metropolitan Detention
Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York:
Subsequent investigations have confirmed that correctional of-
ficers “slammed” these special interest detainees against the
MDC walls, causing pain and bodily harm. . . . Detainees had
their fingers and wrists painfully twisted, or their restraints pul-
led to cause pain and injury to their legs and arms, or were
tripped so that they fell to the floor. While several investigations
were undertaken, the Department of Justice determined that
the evidence was insufficient to proceed with prosecutions.94
Although the arrests and detentions were described as part of the
government’s anti-terrorism offensive, many of the detained were
held for weeks only to then be charged with immigration viola-
tions.95  They were deported under non-criminal charges of over-
staying a visa or working more hours than permitted on a student
visa.96  The majority of those detained were long-term residents,
business owners, and taxpayers; many were married to U.S. citizens
and had children who are U.S. citizens.97  “In Liberty’s Shadow,” a
report recently released by Human Rights First, provides evidence
that in many parts of the country—including California, Illinois,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, Texas, and
Washington, D.C.—parole from detention is rarely granted to asy-
lum seekers.98  In fact, as Amnesty International has documented,
“[t]he INS may jail them for months (in one case recorded in this
report for over a year) after they are granted asylum, while INS at-
torneys (from the same jurisdiction that jails them) appeal against
the granting of asylum.”99 Moreover, INS officials “may refuse to
release asylum-seekers even though an Immigration Judge has de-
termined that they meet the definition of a refugee, a person the
93 Daskal Statement, supra note 91, at IV(1).
94 Id. (citing in part THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE
METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, (Dec. 2003)).
95 See DOJ, DETAINEES REPORT, supra note 90, at Ch. III.
96 A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 81, at 14.
97 Id.
98 Press Release, Human Rights First, Post 9/11, Dramatic Increase in Detention
for Asylum Seekers Says New Report (Jan. 15, 2004), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2004_alerts/0115a.htm.
99 AMNESTY INT’L USA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: DETEN-
TION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS 6 (1999), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
AMR510511999ENGLISH/$File/AMR5105199.pdf.
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USA is bound by treaty to protect.”100
Attorney General John Ashcroft characterized these arrests
and detentions as an important step in the anti-terrorism investiga-
tion.101  In October 2001, he stated,
[O]ur anti-terrorism offensive has arrested or detained nearly
1,000 individuals as part of the September 11 terrorism investi-
gation. Those who violated the law remain in custody. Taking
suspected terrorists in violation of the law off the streets and
keeping them locked up is our clear strategy to prevent terror-
ism within our borders.102
By February 2002, the Department of Justice acknowledged
that most of the persons detained in the course of the September
11th investigations and charged with “immigration violations”—
what it termed “special interest” detainees—were of no interest to
its anti-terrorist efforts because most had been deported for visa
violations.103  These arbitrary arrests, detentions, and interroga-
tions reflected the Department’s unwarranted presumption of
their guilt.104  Such practices also enabled the Department of Jus-
tice to keep people of “special interest” jailed while investigating
and interrogating them about possible criminal activities,105 a form
of preventive detention not permissible under U.S. criminal law.106
Most “special interest” detainees were non-citizen Muslim men.107
Terrorists and immigrants have become synonymous in the
culture of fear and uncertainty that pervades the political climate
of the United States.108  Instead of addressing the public’s fears
and improving protections for immigrants, the Bush administra-
tion has only cultivated the climate of fear and downgraded rights.
In March 2007, agents of the Homeland Security Department’s Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raided a New Bedford,
Massachusetts factory where a large population of undocumented
Latino immigrants worked, arresting workers while their children
100 Id.
101 Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference
(Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive//ag/speeches/2001/ag-
crisisremarks10_25htm.
102 Id.
103 See A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 81, at 18.
104 See generally HRW, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, supra note 88
105 Id. at 4, 10.
106 For the debate on preventive detention, see Whitney D. Frazier, Note, The Con-
stitutionality of Detainment in the Wake of September 11th, 90 KY. L.J. 1089, 1118–23
(2001–2002).
107 See HRW, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, supra note 88, at 4.
108 See generally Kam C. Wong, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Policy of Alienation, 12 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 161 (2006) (detailing the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act).
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were in childcare.109  Worried family members were left calling lo-
cal community organizations to try and find out information about
their loved ones.110  This case is just one illustration of how fear
and anti-immigrant sentiment is tearing apart entire communities.
B. Eroding Civil Liberties
An erosion of civil liberties has accompanied the targeting of
ethnic minorities and recent immigrants.  Although all people liv-
ing in the United States are affected by new intrusions into privacy,
the greatest impact falls on those on the margins of society, in par-
ticular, racial, religious, and ethnic minorities.111  While the Bush
administration’s open and publicized expression of extreme execu-
tive power raises red flags for human rights and civil liberties advo-
cates,112 unchecked executive secrecy also plays an extremely
significant role in creating an environment conducive to these vio-
lations.  Current executive branch secrecy is likely the most ex-
treme this country has witnessed.113  While President Bush uses
national security concerns to justify secrecy around military and
CIA prisons; in practice, secrecy is applied to aspects of govern-
ment that are separate from issues of national security.  For exam-
ple, even when taken to court, the administration refused to
release pertinent information about the workings of Vice President
Cheney’s National Energy Policy Group.114  In addition, Vice Presi-
dent Cheney refused to release the names of the oil, coal, natural
gas, and nuclear industry executives who shaped the group’s policy
recommendations.115
A general blanket of secrecy and information suppression now
109 See Lisa Wangsness, Patrick Blasts Feds for New Bedford Immigration Raid, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/
breaking_news/2007/03/patrick_blasts_1.html. See also Yvonne Abraham, Activist: 90
People in Custody After Immigration Raid in New Bedford, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2007,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/breaking_news/2007/
03/immigration_off.html.
110 See Yvonne Abraham & Brian R. Ballou, 350 Are Held in Immigration Raid: New
Bedford Factory Employed Illegals, U.S. Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1; Maria
Sacchetti & Yvonne Abraham, Fear Grips Kin After Immigration Raid: Woman Recounts
Panic Inside Leather Factory, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2007, at A1.
111 See Louise Cainkar, Post 9/11 Domestic Policies Affecting U.S. Arabs and Muslims: A
Brief Review, 24 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA, AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST 245, 245–48 (2004).
112 See generally A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 81.
113 Id. at 19–21.
114 See In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
115 Complaint at 10, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (disposed of as Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004)).
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covers a vast and growing array of government documents.  The
Bush administration classified 15.6 million documents in fiscal year
2004, which is 81% more than were classified in the year before
September 11, 2001.116  The administration also made information
more difficult to obtain under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) by devoting fewer federal resources to processing such re-
quests.117  In October 2001, Attorney General appointee John Ash-
croft, in a reversal of President Clinton’s directive on FOIA
requests, instructed federal agencies to withhold information
whenever legally possible.118  Indeed, the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) reports a marked decrease in information
available to the public.119  Also, the administration has invoked
“state secrets” privileges—which allow the President to withhold
documents from the courts, Congress, and the public—twenty-
three times between September 2001 and May 2006.120  “State
secrets” privileges were used only four times between 1953 and
1976,121 a twenty-three year period recognized as “[a]t the height
of the Cold War.”122  The “state secret” privilege has been invoked
about twice as many times since 2001.123  The public has no way of
knowing the full extent of document classification by this adminis-
tration,124 nor if all these suppressed documents have any bearing
on “security.”
At the heart of the trend towards expanding the secrecy of
government conduct has been a series of executive branch initia-
tives impinging on public access to information.  These efforts
116 OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, SECRECY REPORT CARD 3 (2005), available at http://
www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2005.pdf [hereinafter SECRECY REPORT CARD].
117 Id. at 5.
118 See American Civil Liberties Union, Attorney General John Ashcroft’s Assault on
Civil Liberties (Sept. 2003), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/
17658leg20021030.html. See also Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen.,
To Heads of All Fed. Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.doi.gov/foia/
foia.pdf; Lou Dolinar, Access Denied for Security, Sites with Sensitive Data Are Being
‘Scrubbed,’ But Government Agencies Are Drawing Some Fire for It, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 2001,
at C8; Mark Helm, Quietly, Feds Alter Rules on Public Files; Reporters Protest, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 18, 2001, at A1.
119 See SECRECY REPORT CARD, supra note 116, at 3.
120 Dana Priest, Secrecy Privilege Invoked in Fighting Ex-Detainee’s Lawsuit, WASH. POST,
May 13, 2006, at A3.
121 SECRECY REPORT CARD, supra note 116, at 1.
122 Id.
123 Id. (noting the use of “state secrets” privilege at least seven times since 2001).
124 See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Cheney’s Office Declares Exemption from Secrecy Oversight,
THE NEW STANDARD, June 7, 2006, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/
items/3261 (noting that Vice President Cheney’s office has refused to provide even
basic and quantitative information about how it classifies documents, defying annual
reporting requirements).
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combine to restrict access to information through a simultaneous
increase in the classification of documents and a decrease in the
declassification of documents.125  As a result, information upon
which human rights organizations rely for their watchdog roles is
more difficult to obtain and, once obtained, is incomplete or
distorted.
The ability of U.S. citizens to enjoy lives free from unwar-
ranted government interference has declined rapidly, while the
ability of their government to act secretly has been enhanced.  The
USA PATRIOT Act, one of the first pieces of domestic legislation
enacted after the attacks on the World Trade Center, greatly ex-
panded the ability of federal officials to carry out searches and
seizures on private homes without prior notice.126  Among other
measures, this legislation, which set the standard for similar copy-
cat laws in other countries, permitted state authorities to “scruti-
nize people’s reading habits by monitoring public library and
bookstore records . . . [while also] allow[ing] for ‘sneak and peak’
tactics such as physical search of property and computers . . . moni-
toring of email, and access to financial and educational records,”
all without the notification of the suspect.127  Provisions in the USA
PATRIOT Act now allow the FBI to access Americans’ personal in-
formation without having to show that the target has any involve-
ment in espionage or terrorism.128  Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act,
the personal records of U.S. persons could only be accessed by the
FBI if there were “specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.”129  The USA PATRIOT Act
dropped this requirement of individualized suspicion.130  With lit-
tle or no judicial oversight, commercial service providers may be
compelled to produce these records solely on the basis of a decla-
125 Id.
126 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(1); 505(a)(2)–(3);
505(b)(2); 505(c)(1)(B), (2)(B), (3)(B)).
127 Amnesty Int’l USA, Civil Rights and the “War on Terror,” http://
www.amnestyusa.org/waronterror/patriotact/ (last visited Oct.31, 2007).
128 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 126, § 215.
129 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000) (records at common carriers, public accom-
modation facilities, physical storage facilities, or vehicle rental facilities); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2709 (b)(1)(B) (2000) (subscriber information, billing information, and electronic
transaction and communication information from wire or electronic communications
service providers); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2000) (records at financial insti-
tutions); 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(c) (2000) (records at consumer reporting agencies).
130 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 126.
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ration from the FBI that the information is for an investigation “to
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.”131  In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act makes it a crime
to reveal that the FBI has “sought or obtained” such informa-
tion.132  Furthermore, under Section 213 of the Act, the govern-
ment can delay notice of a search if it can show “reasonable cause
to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution
of the warrant may have an adverse result.”133
As long as the low standard of ‘reasonable cause’ or ‘reasona-
ble necessity’ is met, police officers can secretly enter a person’s
home or office while they are away and search through and seize
private belongings.134  These new powers are not limited to anti-
terrorism investigations, but rather apply to all federal investiga-
tions, including routine criminal cases.135  Furthermore, Congress
did not create a sunset provision for this section.136  This means
that, unlike some other powers granted in the Act, the Section 213
powers are permanent.  Also under new regulations issued by the
Attorney General, the FBI can now carry out surveillance on any
religious, civic, or political organization in the United States with-
out even the slightest suspicion of wrongdoing.137  By casting fear
among the very groups that monitor government abuses of citizens,
the U.S. government has only furthered its own ability to violate
civil liberties with impunity.
III. CONCLUSION:  RECLAIMING CITIZENSHIP?
This Article has pointed out the dark side of American citizen-
ship in a world of torture.  America wants to be known as a moral
nation, a human rights leader, a chief proponent of democracy
and freedom.138  This simply is not possible as long as the U.S. gov-
131 Id.
132 Id. § 215.
133 § 213(2).
134 Id. See also A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 81, at 10.
135 A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 81, at 7.
136 Id. at 17; USA PATRIOT Act § 224(a).
137 A YEAR OF LOSS, supra note 81, at 10.
138 See, e.g., Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice, Briefing on The State Dept’s 2006
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/mar/81422.htm. (acknowledging “America’s con-
tinued support for those fundamental freedoms embodied in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights”); President George W. Bush, Statement by the President on
the Situation in Burma (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2007/09/20070927-4.html# (calling on “those who embrace the values
of human rights and freedom to support the legitimate demands of the Burmese
people”); President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations Gen. Assembly
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ernment continues to act unilaterally to exempt itself from interna-
tional human rights law, to turn away asylum seekers from its
shores,139 and to mistreat captured prisoners and ethnic minorities
at home and abroad.  Instead of being a leader in the promotion
and protection of human rights, the United States now finds itself
lumped with other flagrant human rights violators, such as Sudan
and China.140  The lesson the United States is teaching the world is
a dangerous one: profess to believe in human rights universalism
while carving out exceptions to the application of human rights
norms.
The good news is that even the most negative citizenship prac-
tices can be changed.  There is nothing natural or static about citi-
zenship.141  The contours of citizenship have been the product of
the imagination of politicians, intellectuals, populists, and publi-
cists.  Throughout history, borders have been redrawn; populations
moved and displaced; the requirements, the benefits, and the re-
sponsibilities and implications of citizenship changed.  Just as the
concept of U.S. citizenship has changed dramatically—negatively
in recent years—there is the possibility that it could shift in a more
positive direction.
Those who have citizenship have the luxury of taking it for
granted.  As we discuss the topic of torture, we suggest that we re-
member our own citizenship and think about what it means when
we are far from our state, as well as within our own state.  Our
citizenship and our location in relation to it greatly inform our per-
sonal responsibility to speak out against our own government’s in-
humane and indecent behavior.
Although citizenship itself is unnatural, there is something in-
tensely natural about wanting what citizenship is said to bestow: a
sense of security, a sense that one can always go home, a sense that
(Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/
20070925-4.html#.
139 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN LIBERTY’S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION CENTER
OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2004), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/libertys_shadow/Libertys_Shadow.pdf (exploring
post-9/11 asylum and detention trends).
140 Nora Boustany, U.S. Has Lost Credibility on Rights, Group Asserts, WASH. POST, Jan.
12, 2007, at A10.
141 See Dan Smith, Reconciling Identities in Conflict, in EUROPE’S NEW NATIONALISM:
STATES AND MINORITIES IN CONFLICT (Richard Caplan & John Feffer eds., 1996) (pro-
viding an excellent discussion on the constructed nature of citizenship).
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there will always be a home.142  The need to reclaim U.S. citizen-
ship—and what it means at home and abroad—has never been
more pressing.
142 See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MI-
NORITY RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
